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Abstract
Patents represent a quid pro quo between the public and the inventor: in exchange for
disclosing the invention, the inventor receives the right to exclude others from practicing her
invention. They therefore serve as a source technical information. Patents also communicate
information to markets and companies that serve to reduce various transaction costs, allowing
more efficient transactions and investment. Patents consequently communicate various types of
information beyond the technical.
There is no reason, however, that such messages must be limited to the technical or the
pecuniary. This Article explores whether patents, like other governmental acts such as
legislation, can create expressive harms. The grant of a patent could communicate a message of
inferiority to groups whose identity is tied to their biology. The Article analyzes this potential
through the paradigm of granting patents on a “gay gene” or other biological process that
predisposes a person towards a homosexual orientation. Other conditions implicated by my
thesis are the deaf, dwarfs, and high-functioning autistics. These groups do not regard
themselves as pathological or in need of “curing,” yet genetic discoveries offer the potential for
their elimination through what is effectively privatized eugenics. The grant of a patent on such
technologies affords the government’s imprimatur of such controversial technologies.
The article first reviews scientific status of homosexuality and then explores whether
patents regarding sexual orientation could a moral signal of inferiority by the government by
suggesting gays and lesbians are pathological. Finally, the article offers various prescriptions
to address this problem.
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What may be considered normal for one individual may be decidedly
abnormal for another; and who is there among us who can decide
which of the two is normal and which abnormal?1

I. INTRODUCTION
Patents traditionally have been justified on the basis of incentives. Commentators have
justified patent law on three different incentive systems: quid pro quo, ex ante, and prospect
theories. Under the quid pro quo view, the patent acts as an incentive for the innovator to
disclose the invention to the public in exchange for the patent’s exclusive rights.2 On the most
basic level, the patent disclosure communicates a message to the public about what the inventor
has discovered and how to make and use that discovery.3 According to the ex ante incentive
view, patents are needed to combat the public good problem of information: without patents,
competitors could free ride on the invention and compete with the innovator without incurring
the research and development costs.4 Such free riding reduces the ex ante incentive to invest in
innovation. The third view, prospect theory, contends that patents create the incentive to
commercialize the invention after the patent has issued.5 By defining the property right

1

Abraham L. Wolbarst, Sexual perversions: their medical and social implications, 134
MEDICAL J. AND RECORD 5, 5 (1931) (quoted in ERIN G. CARLSTON, “A Finer Differentiation”:
Female Homosexuality and the American Medical Community, 1926-1940, in SCIENCE AND
HOMOSEXUALITIES 175, 184 (ed. Vernon A. Rosario) (1997)).
2
See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. --- (forthcoming
2006).
3
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2005). For a general discussion of disclosure obligations, and various
structural flaws in the system that mitigate the patent system’s ability to serve as a source of
technical information, see Holbrook, supra 2, at ---.
4
Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 129, 129 (2004); see also Holbrook, supra note 2, at ---.
5
See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L. & ECON.
265, 266 (1977).
3

surrounding the invention, the inventor can best coordinate later commercialization of the good
in a way akin to prospecting of mineral rights.6
Recent scholarship has persuasively challenged these paradigmatic views and has
demonstrated that patents perform functions far different than providing these basic incentives.
Patents can operate as a vehicle for transmitting messages. For example, patents can serve as a
signal to markets about aspects of the firm. A robust patent portfolio can send a signal to the
market about the nature of a firm’s innovation capacity or other factors relevant to potential
investors.7 The patent thus acts as an intermediary, translating otherwise complicated
information into a simpler form to allow the markets to operate more efficiently. Patents
communicate other information in order to reduce transaction costs: they can facilitate
affirmative asset partitioning by firms and combat “team production” problems arising in efforts
by firms to develop and exploit information assets.8 Patents consequently serve a far greater
communicative effect then simply communicating the technical information regarding the
invention and the scope of the exclusionary rights.
This reality is not surprising. Property rights often involve issues of communication,
messages, and symbols.9 The need for notice of property rights among parties necessitates that
there be a common language of communication and expression of who owns the rights and what

6

Id.
See R. Polk Wagner and Gideon Parchomovsky, Patent Portfolios, U. PENN. L. REV. 1
(2005); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002).
8
Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473,480-99
(2005).
9
See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 610
(1988) (discussing how property rules implicate community communications); Carol M. Rose,
Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 83-85 (1985) [hereinafter, Rose,
Possession].
7

4

those rights are.10 Property rights are more than simply the ability to exclude others. The
messages and signals are necessary elements of any functioning property system.
Patents therefore undeniably act in ways to facilitate signals and communication beyond
there simple disclosure. A patent differs from other forms of property in a significant way: they
are granted by the US government after a substantive review of an application for the right to
exclude. An inventor must demonstrate that she has satisfied the patentability requirements11
and is thus entitled to a patent, which the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
confirms by issuing the patent. The fact that the patent is a grant of a right by the government
enhances the signals of the patent document. The government’s imprimatur help convey the
signal with greater clarity and confidence. The patent has credibility behind it because of the
government’s imprimatur.12
There is no reason that these signals are limited to technical and pecuniary
considerations. The message in the patent also can involve the contents of the invention
contained within it. The government imprimatur attending the patent grant can confirm the
legitimacy of a technology.13 In particular, the genetic revolution has resulted in discoveries
linking genes, proteins, and other biological processes to human behavior generally.14 Research

10

Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1105, 1108 (2003); Rose, Possession, supra note 9, at 84-85.
11
The PTO will grant a patent if the invention is of eligible subject matter, has utility, is
novel and is nonobvious. 35 U.S.C. § §101, 102, 103. The inventor’s application also must
adequately disclose the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
12
Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in
Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469 (2004); Peter Lee, Note, Patents, Paradigm Shifts,
and Progress in Biomedical Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659, 676 (2004).
13
Lee, supra note 12, at 676.
14
DEAN HAMER & PETER COPELAND, LIVING WITH OUR GENES 301 (1998) (“What often
goes unsaid is that genes being discovered also include ones that define behavior. Virtually
every aspect of how we act and feel that has been studied in twins shows genetic influence, and
many of the individual genes have been isolated.”) [hereinafter HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING];
5

into biological causes of behaviors is inevitable and, indeed, has already begun.15 Recent
discoveries include genes that influence aggressiveness,16 weight,17 intelligence, 18 novelty
seeking, worry19 and harm avoidance.20 One scientist has noted that “[t]he real breakthroughs in
understanding personality are not occurring on leather couches but in laboratories.”21 Another
has suggested that “[t]he genetic analysis of behavior will prove to be . . . the most important
advance in the behavioral sciences in [his] lifetime.”22 Many of these discoveries are patentable.
While patents relating to genetically-based diseases are desirable, patents on genes and
processes that influence behaviors, activities, or conditions that are not clearly harmful could be
problematic.23 These discoveries may result in the ability to manipulate or choose preferential
traits, a form of privatized eugenics.24 The PTO inevitably will be grant patents on biological

Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics, 45 VAND. L. REV.
313, 320 (1992).
15
FRANCES FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE 24 (2002) (“But it seems almost
inevitable that we will know much more about genetic causation [of behaviors] even if we never
fully understand how behavior is formed.”); DEAN HAMER & PETER COPELAND, THE SCIENCE OF
DESIRE 187 (1994) (“The discovery of a genetic link to homosexuality is bound to be followed
by discoveries of links to other aspects of personality.”) [hereinafter HAMER & COPELAND,
DESIRE].
16
See, e.g., U.S. Pat. No. 5,418,162; U.S. Pat. No. 6,165,716.
17
HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING, supra note 14, at 9.
18
Id. at 10.
19
Id. at 11.
20
Id. at 55.
21
Id. at 25.
22
RICHARD C. PILLARD, The Search for a Genetic Influence on Sexual Orientation, in
SCIENCE AND HOMOSEXUALITIES 226, 237 (ed. Vernon A. Rosario) (1997).
23
Admittedly, what constitutes a “disease” is infected with the public’s view of
undesirability. SIMON LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE 213-14 (1996) (“[V]alues are intrinsic to the
definition of disease. Most especially, it has been claimed that a key feature of a disease is its
undesirability, although opinions differ as to by whom and for whom . . . the disease is judged
undesirable.”) [hereinafter LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE].
24
See generally Sarah M. Markwood, Comment, Creating a Perfect Human is Not So
Perfect: The Case For Restricting Genetic Enhancement Research, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 473
(2005).
6

discoveries with such eugenic potential. This begs the question of whether we want the patent
system to create an incentive for these types of discoveries.
Moreover, the imprimatur of the patent grant can express the view that such technologies
are legitimate and normatively good. Patents are awarded only for inventions that are useful.
Utility, however, is a relative concept: what is good for one could be destructive to another. This
concern is particularly acute for groups whose identities are tied to their biological state or
behaviors: the invention could be used to destroy these groups by “curing” them or by preventing
their birth through prenatal screening. The grant of patents on these technologies confirms that
the government views them favorably, and could express that these groups are highly disfavored,
further marginalizing them.
Such expressive dimension of intellectual property has been explored previously in
trademark law25 but not in patent law. The Lanham Act proscribes granting federal trademark
registration for a mark that is immoral or scandalous.26 Denying registration does not require the
applicant to stop using the mark and therefore does not preclude use of the mark. Instead, denial
merely creates a disincentive for the owner to continue using the mark due to the lack of
protection. The only reason for denying the trademark registration in this context, therefore, is

25

Copyright, arguably the intellectual property right most closely associated with
expression, ironically does not encounter these types of problems. For one, at least in the United
States, copyright must coincide with the First Amendment. Denial of copyright protection based
on expressive content could violate free speech protections. Second, and more importantly from
an expressive perspective, copyrights are further removed from state action because the
copyright is created the instant the original work is created. While a copyright can be registered
with the Copyright Office, such registration is not required for the grant of the copyright. The
government need not review the work to determine whether it satisfies the conditions of
originality. Given this distance from governmental action, the idea that a copyright could convey
an expressive message with respect to governmental views of a group is not well founded.
26
15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
7

the potential that the government would be viewed as approving of such a scandalous mark.27
The concern of the government sending the wrong message is purely an expressive
consideration.28
This Article argues that patents also possess the potential to express governmental
preferences for, disfavor towards, or even condemnation of various members of society. The
recent discoveries into human biology portend discoveries that relate to various conditions that
are central to a person’s identity. The deaf, for example, do not view their condition as a
pathological condition in need of curing: to them, they are simply a language minority. Similar
concerns have been expressed others, such as high-functioning autistics and little people. Patents

27

Although the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has denied that registration can act as
providing government imprimatur, see In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216,
1220 n.4 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (rejecting as erroneous the “concern that the issuance of a trademark
registration for applicant's mark amounts to the awarding of the U.S. Government's ‘imprimatur’
to the mark”), it has provided no other policy or theoretical justification for this exclusion. The
lack of a justification begs the question of why the “immoral” or “scandalous” restriction is in
the Lanham Act. The TTAB has hidden behind its role of applying the statutory requirements
but does not explain why the requirements, as a policy matter, are there in the first place. The
legislative history suggests that Congress wanted to discourage the use of such marks. Hearings
on 4744 Before the Subcomm. on Trademarks of the House Comm. on Patents, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess. 18 (1939) (hereinafter Hearings) (statement of Rep. Thomas E. Robertson); see also
Kimberly A. Pace, The Washington Redskins Case and the Doctrine of Disparagement: How
Politically Correct Must A Trademark Be?, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 7, 22 (1994).
Denying registration, though, does not prevent a marks use. Thus, the only conceivable basis is
to avoid giving the “stamp of approval” of an immoral or scandalous through the granting of a
federal right. Cf. GRAEME B. DINWOODIE AND MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR
COMPETITION LAW & POLICY at 331 (2004).
28
For a discussion of trademark law’s implications for the queer community, see generally
Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Semiotics of the Scandalous and the Immoral and The Disparaging:
Section 2(a) Trademark Law after Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
L. REV. 187, 191 (2005).
8

on discoveries related to such conditions would communicate the message that “curing”29 these
people would be normatively good, further marginalizing these groups.
A particular group whose trait is increasingly shown to be biologically related has already
borne the brunt societal and expressive marginalization: gays and lesbians. Recent scientific
studies have demonstrated that homosexuality is undoubtedly influenced by biology, even if it is
not biologically determined in all cases.30 A likely result of such research into the origins of
sexual orientation would be methods to “cure” gays and lesbians.31 An even more likely
scenario would be a pre-natal screen that would identify the likelihood that the fetus will be gay,
permitting termination of the pregnancy32 or perhaps consumption of some sort of pill to reduce
the likelihood of bearing a gay child.33
As such, the quest to find the “gay gene” or other biological origins of homosexuality has
potential for the patent to express moral condemnation of gays and lesbians. Although a patent

29

I place the word cure in quotation because, to these groups, it is condescending. I use the
term merely for rhetorical force to demonstrate the stigmatization such language can cause these
groups.
30
See, e.g., Brian S. Mustanski, et. al., A genomewide scan of male sexual orientation, 116
HUM. GENETICS 272, 272-73 (2005).
31
As Dean Hamer notes humorously: “Another danger is that we will medicalize normal
human behavior and variations.. . . What about that pesky gay gene? Spray it away with new
‘Straight-in-a-Day!’” HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING, supra note 34, at 35, 40-42.
32
Id. at 85 (“Hanging over the entire field of genetics has been the specter of eugenics –
that is, the deliberate breeding of people for certain selected heritable traits.”); ROSARIO , supra
note 48, at 6 ([T]he classification of homosexuality as abnormal or pathological does not exist in
an essential way within its examination by scientists, but is constructed from a complex
interaction of social values and individual researchers’ and subjects’ approaches, methods, and
presuppositions.”); LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN, supra note 67, at 171 (“On the one hand, this search
[for a gay gene], if successful, seems to promise the most direct support for a liberating ‘born
that way’ argument. On the other hand, it raises what is invariably described as the ‘specter of
Nazi eugenics’ – the possibility that attempts will be made to eliminate homosexuality through
genetic ‘therapy,’ through the selective destruction of fetuses that carry ‘gay genes,’ or through
sterilization of gay adults.”).
33
FUKUYAMA, supra note 15, at 39-40.
9

relating to sexual orientation or the alteration of such orientation has yet to issue, at least one
researcher in this field has confirmed his intent to pursue patent protection such a discovery.34
This Article will explore the potential for patents to perform a social signaling function,
apart from the market-signal articulated in portfolio theory. I contend that patents communicate
information that is relevant not only in a technical or pecuniary sense but also in a normative
one. Central to this signaling is the utility doctrine, which delineates the inventions that are
socially beneficial and thus worthy of patent protection. I explore these contentions using the
paradigm of sexual orientation because it is pregnant with issues of morality and the potential for
expressive consequences. Granting patents on genes related to sexual orientation, and potentially
other conditions such as deafness, high-functioning autism, or dwarfism, communicates
government approval that these groups are pathological and should be cured. Such a
communication expressively harms these groups. This line of argument contributes an additional
basis to criticize granting certain patents in areas relating to human biology and genetics.35

34

Dean Hamer has stated that he plans to use the rights to exclude others from using the
discovery in a way harmful to others. DEAN HAMER & PETER COPELAND, LIVING WITH OUR
GENES 219 (1998) (“I would try to use the law to withhold the ‘testing’ technology should it
ever become available. Genetic testing as practiced in the United States requires
commercialization, and commercialization generally requires protection of intellectual property
through patents. If a lab does discover a ‘gay gene,’ it might be able to control the licensing of
the technology.”); see also GARLAND E. ALLEN, The Double-Edged Sword of Genetic
Determinism: Social and Political Agendas in Genetic Studies of Homosexuality, 1940-1994, in
SCIENCE AND HOMOSEXUALITIES 227 (ed. Vernon A. Rosario) (1997) (“[Hamer] also vowed to
patent his genetic testing techniques to insure that they could not be used in a discriminatory
way.”).
35
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation: The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (May 1998); Jordan Paradise, Lori
Andrews, and Timothy Holbrook, Patents on Human Genes—An Analysis of Scope and Claims,
307 SCIENCE 1566 (March 11, 2005); Bagley, supra note 12; Jonathan Kahn, What’s the Use?
Law and Authority in Patenting Human Genetic Material, 14 STAN. L. & POL. R. 417, 423
(2003); Joshua C. Benson, Note, Resuscitating the Patent Utility Requirement, Again: a Return
to Brenner v. Manson, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 267, 270 (2002); MARGARET DAVIES AND NGAIRE
NAFFINE, ARE PERSONS PROPERTY? 155-56 (2002) 56 (“Indigenous people and third-world
10

In Part II of this article, I detail the biology of human sexual orientation, demonstrating
that patents in this area are inevitable. Part III examines more rigorously the way in which a
patent could signal condemnation of these various biologically-influenced groups. Part IV will
then explore various prescriptions for dealing with this expressive harm.
II. THE BIOLOGY OF HOMOSEXUALITY
Homosexuality is undeniably in the moral margins of society. Although attitudes have
shifted over the years, with ever increasing acceptance in today’s society, a substantial portion of
the U.S. population still views homosexuality as immoral, often due to religious beliefs.36 As
recently as 1974, homosexuality was viewed as a psychological pathology in need of treatment.
More recently, however, gays and lesbians have obtained greater acceptance socially
and legally. Homosexuality is no longer considered a disease, and psychological treatments to
change sexual orientation have been condemned by the medical establishment as ineffective and
potentially harmful. 37 Legally, states and localities are affording gays and lesbians far more

activists around the world have reacted strongly against sampling and patenting specifically
directed at their regional genetic characteristics, arguing that it is an act of ‘bio-piracy’ and a
violation of cultural self-determination.’”); Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts Over
Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the European Union: An Argument
for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1667 (2001).
These previous critiques differ from the one articulated in this Article. My argument is
that, as a grant of property by the government, patents on inventions that relate to the identity of
certain groups could inflict harm on that group by suggesting they are less-deserving or should
be “cured.” The difference is subtle – previous criticisms, particularly based on identity, have
condemned gene patents for affording property rights over what is quintessentially something
that helps provide identity. My argument is that the government’s role, by granting patents, in
fact suggests a preference for or against certain groups that are closely associated with that
characteristic. My argument would apply not only to genes but also to other biological processes
that help determine personality or non-pathological behaviors. In this article, I do not argue that
patenting of all genes, particularly those relating to diseases, is inappropriate.
36
See Julian W. Slowinski, Therapeutic Dilemmas: Solving Sexual Difficulties in the
Context of Religion, 26 J. OF SEX ED. AND THERAPY 272, 278 (2001).
37
ROBERT ALAN BROOKEY, REINVENTING THE MALE HOMOSEXUAL: THE RHETORIC AND
POWER OF THE GAY GENE 37 (2002); HUBERT KENNEDY, Karl Heinrich Ulrichs: First Theorist
11

legal protections than in the past. Many localities afford domestic partner benefits to same-sex
couples, and some states have begun to offer civil unions that afford rights equivalent to those of
married couples.38 Massachusetts legalized same-sex marriage itself.39 Even the U.S. Supreme
Court’s view of gays and lesbians has shifted dramatically.40 The expressive dimension to these
decisions is expressly noted in the opinions.41
Notwithstanding such progress, homosexuality in the United States remains a topic of
considerable moral debate. Many religions condemn homosexual conduct as immoral and view
homosexuals as “disordered.”42 Members of Congress have proposed a constitutional
amendment to prohibit state and local governments from affording marriage rights to same-sex
couples.43 A primary argument used by those opposed to gay rights is that homosexuality is a
chosen lifestyle. In response to this argument, the gay rights movement has argued that

of Homosexuality, in SCIENCE AND HOMOSEXUALITIES 26, 39 (ed. Vernon A. Rosario) (1997);
LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 211.
38
Baker v. Vermont, 170 Vt. 194 (1999); Connecticut began recognizing civil unions on
October 1, 2005. See William Yardley, Connecticut Approves Civil Unions for Gays, N.Y.
TIMES at B5 (April 21, 2005).
39
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003).
40
In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the Courtheld unconstitutional on equal
protection grounds an amendment to the Colorado constitution that prohibited any arm of the
state from extending legal protection to gays and lesbians. Id. at 635. In Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003), the Court found held sodomy laws unconstitutional as a violation of due
process, overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In surprisingly strong language,
the Court noted that “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.”
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
41
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (“[Bowers] continuance as precedent demeans the lives of
homosexual persons.”); Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (The Colorado amendment “classifie[d]
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone
else.”).
42
See generally ALICE OGDEN BELLIS & TERRY L. HUFFORD, SCIENCE, SCRIPTURE, AND
HOMOSEXUALITY 13 (2002). See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶¶ 2357-59
(2005) (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P85.HTM) (last visited March 2, 2005). The
43
See, e.g., See Jan Crawford Greenburg, Gay marriage ban rejected, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
Nov. 19, 2003, at 1; Evelyn Nieves, Family Values Groups Gear Up For Battle Over Gay
Marriage, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 17, 2003, at A6, also available in 2003 WL 5651316.
12

homosexuality is not a choice. To bolster this argument, advocates suggest that – be it nature or
nurture – there is no volition in deciding that one is gay or lesbian.
Due in part to this debate, scientists have performed numerous investigations into the
biological44 cause of homosexuality. Sexual orientation, even biologically speaking, is a
complex characteristic; finding a single cause is highly unlikely.45 Sexual orientation is most
likely influenced by a number of biological factors.46 Overall, a person likely possesses
biologically determined disposition toward a certain sexual orientation, which is resistant to
alteration.47
This section reviews the studies exploring the biology of sexual orientation. These
investigations confirm that sexual orientation is strongly influenced by biology, even if the
particular mechanisms are presently unknown.48 Four categories of studies have demonstrated

44

When I refer to “biological” causes of homosexuality, I include both genetic, heritable
causes and congenital causes, such as hormone levels in the uterus or relative placement of a
fetus in the uterus. Such factors would be distinct from post- birth interactions with the
environment, such as parental influence. One possible exception could be if, for example,
something in a mother’s milk transferred hormones to the child, impacting the child’s sexual
orientation. At this time, no such evidence exists but, because the impact would result from a
physical exposure – hormone levels – I would also consider this to be biological even though it
occurs after birth.
45
HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING, supra note 14, at 198 (“We do not expect to find a gene
that is the same in every gay man – we already know that sexual orientation is more complex
than that—just one that is correlated to sexual orientation.”); Ronald Kotulak, Homosexuality
may be issue of brain chemistry, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 13, 2003, at 22 (“’I don’t think
homosexuality can easily be conceptualized as just one thing – a phenomenon that is due to one
particular developmental pathway.’” (quoting Feino F. L. Meyer-Bahlburg, a Columbia
University professor of clinical psychology)).
46
Mustanski, supra note 30, at 273 (“Given the complexity of sexual orientation, numerous
genes are likely to be involved. . . .”); PILLARD, supra note 22, at 230.
47
Id. at 233.
48
I use “environmental” to refer to non-biological influences. This is in contrast to a
geneticist, who would view, for example, variations in intrauterine conditions as
“environmental.” See Vernon A. Rosario, Homosexual Bio-Histories: Genetic Nostalgias and
the Quest for Paternity, in SCIENCE AND HOMOSEXUALITIES 1, 4 (ed. Vernon A. Rosario)
13

this influence: twin studies, physical differences in the brain, the identification of the location of
a potential gay gene, and the birth-order phenomenon.49
A. Twin Studies Demonstrate Genetic Influence on Sexual Orientation
The classic method for assessing the genetic influence on a trait is to study monozygotic,
or identical, twins separated at birth. Because these siblings have an identical genetic makeup
but do not share the same environment, such studies can mitigate the impact of environmental
influences on the expression of a given trait.50 For sexual orientation studies, however, such data
are not readily available.51 Instead the studies have focused on the differences between
monozygotic (identical) twins, dizygotic (fraternal) twins, and siblings.52 If a trait is genetically
linked, then monozygotic twins will more likely share the trait, whereas dizygotic twins will
possess the trait at the same ratio as a non-twin sibling.53 and. If the trait is influenced by
intrauterine factors, then dizygotic twins will share the trait more frequently than non-twin
siblings.54

(1997)). Thus, I eschew the geneticist definition, focusing on potential biological sources of
homosexuality. See supra note 44.
49
These studies exclusively deal with gay men and not with lesbians. Little is known about
the origins of lesbianism. See, e.g., Edward M. Miller, Homosexuality, Birth Order, and
Evolution: Toward an Equilibrium Reproductive Economics of Homosexuality, 29 ARCHIVES OF
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 1, 14 (2000); Domonick J. Wegesin, A Neuropsychologic Profile of
Homosexual and Heterosexual Men and Women, 27 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 91, 92
(1998).
50
See BELLS AND HUFFORD, supra note 42, at 29; LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23,
at 177; LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 177.
51
Gay identical twins that have been reared separately have been studied, but the numbers
are too small to have any statistical significant. Id. at 178.
52
Id. 25-30.
53
PILLARD, supra note 22, at 234. Adoptive siblings will share the trait at same rate as the
population as a whole. Id.
54
Id. at 234.
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Numerous twin studies have been performed with respect to homosexuality.55 Some of
the earliest studies evaluating the inheritability of homosexuality involved the use of twins.56
The study performed by J. Michael Bailey and Richard Pillard found that in 52% of the cases, if
one monozygotic twin was gay, then the other also was.57 The rates for fraternal twin brothers
was 22%.58 The concordance rate for adopted brothers was only 11%.59 Thus, while not entirely
determined by genetics,60 homosexuality does have a strong genetic component. A concordance
rate of less than 100% does not mean there is no genetic component to homosexuality or that
homosexuality arises strictly due to environmental forces.61 For other anatomical and
biochemical conditions, concordance rates can be less than 100% due to other biological
mechanisms coming into play.62 The gay gene may simply be inactive in the unaffected
sibling.63 Numerous other twin studies have performed that confirm a genetic influence.64
Regardless, “[t]here is no room for doubt that homosexuality is highly heritable.”65

55

See MATT RIDLEY, GENOME 117 (1999) (“A dozen other studies came to a similar
conclusion [that a gene or genes contribute to homosexuality].”); LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra
note 23, at 173-78.
56
BELLS AND HUFFORD, supra note 42, at 26.
57
J. Michael Bailey and Richard Pillard, A Genetic Study of Male Sexual Orientation, 48
ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 1092 (1991).
58
Id.
59
ALLEN supra note 34, at 252.
60
An exclusively genetic trait would have a concordance rate of 100%. BELLS AND
HUFFORD, supra note 42, at 26.
61
See William J. Turner, Homosexuality, Type 1: An Xq28 Phenomenon, 24 ARCHIVES OF
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 109, 125-26 (1995).
62
Id.; HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING, supra note 14, at 188. Studies suggest, however, that
shared parental environment has almost no impact on sexual orientation. HAMER & COPELAND,
LIVING, supra note 14, at 188 (“In the most careful twin study to date, the best mathematical
estimate for the shared environmental component of variance was 0 percent.”).
63
Turner, supra note 61, at 126.
64
See Mustanski, supra note 30, at 273;B ELLS AND HUFFORD, supra note 42, at 27-28;
LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 175-77.
65
RIDLEY, supra note 55, at 117; see also LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 177.
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B. The Gay Brain – Variations in the Hypothalamus
In addition to twin studies, researchers have explored whether there could be physical
differences between gays and straights that might suggest a biological origin to sexual
orientation. A natural place to look for such physiological differences would be the brain given
that sexual attraction and arousal is strongly rooted there. Of particular importance is the
hypothalamus, the part of the brain from which sexual desire originates.66 Researcher Simon
LeVay discovered that the size of the hypothalamus differs between homosexual heterosexual
men.67 Prior research showed that the hypothalamus of men and women differ in size in a
statistically significant way.68 In LeVay’s study, he found that, on average, the gay men’s
hypothalamus were two to three times smaller than heterosexual men’s and were the same size as
women’s.69 Such a finding suggests that the neuronal mechanisms in the brain that regulate
sexual behavior may differ physically between gay and straight men.70 This result is consistent
with studies on cognitive differences between gays and straights71 and with studies done on
animals demonstrating same-sex attraction. 72 Subsequent studies also have shown variations in

66

See STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 89

(2002).
67

SIMON LEVAY, THE SEXUAL BRAIN 120 (1993) [hereinafter LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN].
LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN, supra note 67, at 120. The hypothalamus is a tiny region at the
base of the brain. LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 130. LeVay specifically studied
the INAH 3 region, which is sexually dimorphic. LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN, supra note 67, at 120.
For convenience, I will refer generally to the hypothalamus.
69
LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN, supra note 67, at 121; LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23,
at 143.
70
LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN, supra note 67, at 121. LeVay considered alternative possible
causes for the size difference, such as whether AIDS had changed the size of the hypothalamuses
of the gay men. He concludes that AIDS was not the cause of the difference, but recognizes that
using AIDS victims risks a sampling bias. Id.
71
Wegesin, supra note 49, at 94.
72
LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 199. Homosexual acts have been observed in
a variety of animals. Id. at 197; see also Larry Thompson, Search for a Gay Gene, TIME 60-61
(June 12, 1995) (homosexuality in fruit flies). Homosexual conduct is “widely distributed in the
68
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the brain structures of gays and straights.73 These differences in brain structure could be a result
genetic or hormonal influence on the development of the brain.
There is a “chicken-and-egg” problem to these studies. The brain is a dynamic organ
that changes over time. As such, environmental factors – such as engaging in different sexual
behaviors – could change the shape of the hypothalamus or program it to react to certain
stimuli.74 So, these results beg the question of whether the brain differences influenced sexual
orientation or whether sexual orientation influenced the changes in the brain.75 Regardless, there
is considerable scientific evidence that the physical structure of the brain plays a significant role
in sexual orientation.
C. The “Gay Gene” Marker
One possibility for the physical differences between gay and straight brains is that a gene
or genes could influence development of the brain. If there is such a genetic link, then
homosexuality should run in families.76 In fact, it does – both gay men and lesbians have a

animal kingdom.” PAUL R. EHRLICH, HUMAN NATURES 195 (2000). Hypothalamus differences
have been found in rams as well. Ronald Kotulak, Homosexuality may be issue of brain
chemistry, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 13, 2003, at 22.
73
Miller, supra note 49, at 13. In a study of the reaction to men to male-derived chemicals,
the homosexual men in the study responded in the same manner as straight women, with
activation of the hypothalamus, whereas heterosexual men showed no response. See Ivanka
Savic, et. al, Brain response to putative pheromones in homosexual men, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES 7356, 7356 (May 17, 2005).
74
See, e.g., BELLS AND HUFFORD, supra note 42, at 36; LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note
23, at 144 ([T]here is always at least the theoretical possibility that the structural differences are
actually the result of differences in sexual behavior.” (emphasis in original)).
75
See Savic et al., supra note 73, at 7361 (noting causation of hormone response could be
hypothalamus differentiation, acquired sensitization through stimuli, or association with scent to
sex); ROSARIO, supra note 48, at 5 (“[A] larger INAH 3 might be either one of the causes of male
heterosexuality, or the by-product of a heterosexual lifestyle choice.”); LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN,
supra note 67, at 122.
76
PILLARD, supra note 22, at 233.
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greater likelihood having gay or lesbian siblings.77 Researcher Dean Hamer recognized this
reality, resulting in perhaps the most startling – and controversial – scientific study into the
biological cause of homosexuality: he identified a link between a known genetic marker on the X
chromosome and homosexuality, suggesting a gene influencing sexual orientation may be at that
location.
Hamer had noted that the maternal branches of his subjects contained a disproportionate
number of homosexual family members.78 If a characteristic seems to be passed to a son by the
mother and not the father, then it likely is controlled by a gene on the X chromosome.
Recognizing the likelihood that homosexuality could be a sex-linked trait, Hamer performed a
linkage study on his subjects79 and found a statistically significant link between a known marker,
Xq28, and the trait of male homosexuality.80 The study concluded that the “linkage results
[were] statistically significant at a confidence level of >99 percent.”81
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Id. at 227; Sven Bocklandt, et. al., Extreme skewing of X chromosome inactivation in
mothers of homosexual men, 118 HUM. GENETICS 691, 691 (2006); Mustanski, supra note 30, at
273.
78
HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING, supra note 14, at 190; HAMER & COPELAND, DESIRE,
supra note 15, at 93-94.
79
HAMER & COPELAND, DESIRE, supra note 15, at 120-133. A linkage study does not
identify a gene for a given trait but instead shows a statistical relationship between a stretch of
DNA and a trait. PILLARD, supra note 22, at 235. Specifically, such studies examine the
statistical probability that there is a gene associated with a phenotypic trait on a chromosome at a
known location, the marker. The linkage is demonstrated through the use of markers, which are
genes or gene fragment that are known on a given chromosome. These markers act as road signs
because, on a single chromosome, genes generally stay together because chromosomes generally
do not split themselves into pieces during meiotic cell division. Genes located on the same
chromosome are generally inherited together. So, if there is a gay gene on the X chromosome, it
will almost always be beside a given marker. The linkage study examined whether the gay
members of a family share a marker that the straight members did not. If such a correlation
exists, then the trait – homosexuality – may have a genetic component located near that marker.
See generally HAMER & COPELAND, DESIRE, supra note 15, at 113.
80
HAMER & COPELAND, DESIRE, supra note 15, at 121. By chance, brothers would
normally have a 50% chance of sharing the markers; Hamer found that 83% of the gay brothers
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Although some have disputed this linkage,82 Hamer subsequently confirmed his results.83
Other studies have also suggested a genetic influence arising from the X chromosome.84 More
recent investigations have expanded the search for genes influencing orientation beyond the X
chromosome and have identified three new regions where potential “gay genes” may be
located.85 Thus, researchers are likely to find genes that influence sexual orientation, discoveries
that would be eligible for patent protection. Minimally, the quest continues in earnest.
D. Male Birth Order Phenomenon Suggests Congenital Cause
Genes may not be the only biological trigger for homosexuality. Recent studies have also
demonstrated a potential congenital cause for male homosexuality. The more sons that a woman

had matching variants, while the control of random pairs of brothers satisfied the expected 50%
rate. ALLEN, supra note 34, at 253.
81
Dean H. Hamer et al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and Male
Sexual Orientation, 261 SCIENCE 321 (July 16, 1993) (as reprinted in HAMER & COPELAND,
DESIRE, supra note 15, at App. A). Importantly, the study did not find a gay gene. It merely
found an association between homosexuality and a location on the X chromosome.
82
A group of researchers at the University of Western Ontario failed to find any markers
linked to homosexuality. LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 184-85. Importantly, these
results were not published in a peer-reviewed journal. Mustanski, supra note 30, at 273.
Moreover, the methodology of that study renders its findings ambiguous as to the impact of
Xq28 on homosexuality because the study looked at paternal relatives, not maternal. HAMER &
COPELAND, LIVING, supra note 14, at 197.
83
BELLS AND HUFFORD, supra note 42, at 25; LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at
183-84; Mustanski, supra note 30, at 273.
84
Turner, supra note 61, at 121, 125. A recent study found that mothers of gay men tend to
have more offspring. This study provides further support for a genetic predisposition for
homosexuality and also offers a theory to resolve the Darwinian paradox – that a gene for
homosexuality should die out because it does not encourage propagation of the gene. Andrea
Camperio-Ciani, et al., Evidence for maternally inherited factors favoring male homosexuality
and promoting female fecundity, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B: BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES
04PB0377.1, 04PB0377.3 (published on-line 2004); see also Study links genes, male
homosexuality, www.cnn.com (Oct. 13, 2004) (“‘The key factor is that these genes both
influence homosexuality in men, higher fecundity in females and are in the maternal and not the
paternal line.’” (quoting Andrea Camperio-Ciani)) (available at
www.cnn.com/2004/tech/science/10/13/homosexuality.study.reut/ndex.html) (last visited Oct.
19, 2004).
85
Mustanski, supra note 30, at 276.
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has, the increased likelihood that the subsequent son will be gay.86 So, younger brothers are
more likely to be gay than their older brothers. Interestingly, the presence of sisters is irrelevant,
resulting in a fraternal birth order effect.87 While anecdotally, many gay men have noted that
they and many of their friends are the youngest in the family, the studies show that there is more
to this phenomenon than simple coincidence. Each additional older brother increases the
likelihood of homosexuality by about one-third,88 and the phenomenon has been documented
not only in the United States but also in Britain, the Netherlands, and Canada.89
Scientists have yet to demonstrate the process resulting in the birth-order effect, although
they have posited various theories. Hormone levels, or the fetuses susceptibility to hormones,
could influence sexual orientation.90 A woman could build up a “resistance” to the male fetus,
creating more female hormones.91 These hormones may interfere with the determination of the
cells and brain structures that result in a heterosexual child.92 If the hormones act to prevent
masculinization of the developing fetus – or allow effeminization – the result could be changes
86

See David W. Purcell et al., Birth Order in a Contemporary Sample of Gay Men, 29
ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 349, 352-53 (2000); RIDLEY, supra note 55, at 118 (“A man
with one or more elder brothers is more likely to be gay than a man with no siblings, only
younger siblings, or with one or more elder sisters.”); Ray Blanchard and Anthony F. Bogaert,
Birth Order in Homosexual v. Heterosexual Sex Offenders Against Children, Pubescents, and
Adults¸27 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 595, 595-96 (1998).
87
Purcell, supra note 86, at 350; RIDLEY, supra note 55, at 118.
88
RIDLEY, supra note 55, at 118.
89
Id.
90
FUKUYAMA, supra note 15, at 37.
91
Purcell et al., supra note 86, at 354; Blanchard and Bogaert, supra note 87, at 602 (both
suggesting the fraternal birth order phenomenon “reflects the progressive immunization of some
mothers to Y-linked minor histocompatibility antigens (H-Y antigen) by each succeeding male
fetus, and the concomitantly increasing effects of H-Y antibodies on the sexual differentiation of
the brain in each succeeding male fetus.”).
92
Blanchard and Bogaert, supra note 87, at 602. Ridley notes that the H-Y gene is similar
to a gene that encodes the anti-Mullerian hormone, responsible for causing the regression of the
Mullerian ducts in a male embryo. RIDLEY, supra note 55, at 119. These ducts are the
precursors to the uterus and Fallopian tubes and, thus, their regression is essential for the
development of a male embryo. RIDLEY, supra note 55, at 119.
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in the sexual differentiation of the brain.93 Finally, there could be a genetic component as well,
such as genes that influence how the fetus interacts with the intrauterine hormones.94

All of these biological investigations demonstrate that sexual orientation is influenced by
biological mechanisms. Patents on these discoveries therefore are highly likely, if not inevitable.
III. THE POTENTIAL FOR EXPRESSIVE HARMS FROM PATENTS
Important with respect to all of these investigations is that science is not exempt from
biases.95 The framing of their investigations reveal a subtle yet pervasive bias. If the search was
truly objective, the search would be for “sexual orientation,” but all of the investigations are
looking for the cause of homosexuality. By distinguishing homosexuality, inherently they
suggest that homosexuality (or any variant from heterosexuality) is outside the norm.
Notwithstanding the seemingly pro-gay discussion, the science remains inherently hetero-centric,
which has significant consequences for the potential expressive impact patents on these
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RIDLEY, supra note 55, at 119 (“If so, the effect of a strong immune reaction against
these proteins from the mother would be partly to prevent the masculinisation of the brain, but
not that of the genitals.”); Blanchard and Bogaert, supra note 87, at 602; LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN,
supra note 67, at 123
94
Miller, supra note 49, at 6. (“Such genes might change the level of hormones during
prenatal critical periods, or the receptor density, or the level of enzymes that convert one steroid
to another, or the level of binding proteins, or the permeability of the blood-brain barrier to
hormones. . . .just enumerating some of the possible pathways makes it plausible that multiple
genes could be involved.”); LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 125. Miller suggests that
the birth order effect would have reproductive advantages because later-born, more feminized
sons would “reduce[] the probability of these sons engaging in unproductive competition with
each other.” Id. at 30.
The recent study on the fecundity of mothers also supports these various hypotheses. In
order for the birth-order phenomenon to take place, necessarily a given female must have a fair
number of off-spring. The link between male homosexuality and increased female fecundity
further supports the “immunization view.”
95
Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 14, at 339 (“But the image of neutrality . . .is largely a
myth. . . .Defining what is ‘natural,’ science is readily appropriated as a way to conform
individuals to institutional values and existing social or political conventions.”).
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processes may have. These studies, however, also risk further marginalizing gays and lesbians
by looking them as biologically flawed and in need of being “cured.” A similar situation is faced
by other groups who may not view themselves as being pathological or in need of curing, such as
the deaf, dwarfs, and high-functioning autistics. Patents related to these technologies would
confirm the legitimacy of such technology through the government’s imprimatur, signaling
governmental approval of efforts to cure these groups. The patent system is thus directly
implicated in these technologies and fostering an incentive to create eugenic technologies that
will be in the hands of private parties.
A. What Are Expressive Harms?
Expressive theories of law are concerned with the way in which government action can
communicate a specific belief or attitude of the state, such as hostility to racial or ethnic groups
or religion.96 Under this view, laws can shape or reinforce social norms and also inflict harms to
members of society.97 Indeed, it is beyond cavil that “the linguistic meaning of governmental
action can have a moral impact.”98 Laws can be examined normatively by assessing how they
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See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1506 (2000) [hereinafter Anderson & Pildes, Expressive
I].
97
Mark D. Rosen, Establishment, Expressivism, and Federalism, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
669, 670 (2003).
98
Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 1363, 1494 (2000). Within the academic literature, there has been a debate over what
constitutes “expressivism” and whether such a theory can justify certain laws. Compare id. at
1364 with Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 96. Both of these camps, however,
recognize that government acts can have expressive impacts. See Matthew D. Adler, Meaning,
Nonlinguistic "Expression," and the Multiple Variants of Expressivism: A Reply Response To
Professors Anderson And Pildes, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1577 (2000). I am not suggesting
that patent law is justified by expressive theory. Instead, I am exploring the proposition that both
sides agree could occur: the grant of a patent, a form of government communication, can express
disfavor or hostility towards certain members of society.
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express certain intentions and attitudes.99 Racial segregation, for example, communicates that
blacks are inferior to whites and that whites must be protected against blacks.100 The expressive
harm occurs regardless of whether the target – here blacks – believe or accept the message; so
long as they understand the message communicated, the harm arises.101 What is important is the
“social, or symbolic, meaning” of certain laws or other acts by the state.102
Specifically, “[e]xpressive theories of action tell us to express certain attitudes
adequately, [the standard for which] is not met simply by intending to express those attitudes, or
by thinking that one’s actions do express those attitudes. There need not be an intent to
communicate a certain message for there to be expressive harms.[103] Rather, the standard of
adequacy is public, set by objective criteria for determining the meaning of action.”104 Thus,
somewhat surprisingly, the intentions of an actor are not the only factors relevant in assessing the
expressive impact those acts.105 The expressive harm can arise when people understand the
message communicated, even if they may not agree with the message.106
Expressive considerations help explain “why the consequences matter, and which
consequences matter,” both of which are important because these impacts occur to people, not
99

Rosen, supra note 97, at 669-70; Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 96, at

1508.
100

See, e.g., Johnson v. California, No. 03-636, 2005 WL 415281, at *5 (S. Ct. Feb. 23,
2005) (“Racial classifications raise special fears that they are motivated by an invidious purpose.
Thus, we have admonished time and again that, "[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry into the
justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining ... what
classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial
politics.”); see also Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 96, at 1528.
101
Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 96, at 1528.
102
Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 40-41
(2002).
103
Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 96, at 185. Anderson and Pildes note that
“communicative acts are only a small subset of all expressive acts.” Id.
104
Id. at 1512.
105
Id. at 1513.
106
Id. at 1545.
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simply abstract institutions.107 Any interpretation of the impact of course will depend on the
context of the communication.108 A person will suffer an expressive harm when “she is treated
according to principles that express negative or inappropriate attitudes towards her.”109 Under
expressive theories, “state action should be wrong . . . when it expresses impermissible
valuations, without regard to further concerns about its cultural or material consequences.”110
The acts of the state can thus send a signal what the norms of a society ought to be.111
Law can impact the views of individuals about which behaviors are approved or disapproved by
society as whole,112 resulting in an actor understanding how others will view her behavior.113
The state can act as a collective to express certain views, even if those views differ from those of
individual legislators.114 The legislative process also can affect attitudes expressively by
revealing new information to society regarding a given subject.115 Indeed, there may not even
have to be a law passed – simple disclosure by the government may have expressive impacts.116
Expressive theory is present in a number of legal areas. Equal protection jurisprudence is
rife with concerns of government stigmatization or marginalization of people based on
characteristic such as race, ethnicity, and gender.117 The courts have found laws unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause even absent any actual, non-psychic harm: the expression of
107

Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 96, at 1513.
Id. at 1525.
109
Id. at 1527-28.
110
Id. at 1531.
111
See Geisinger, supra note 102, at 43; Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of
Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2029-44 (1996).
112
Geisinger, supra note 102, at 45.
113
Id. at 47.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 64-65.
116
Id. at 67. Geisinger uses the example of the Surgeon General announcing the harm from
second-hand smoke. Id. While not a statute, it is a communication of information from an arm
of the state. Thus, the government can send signals even absent an passage of an actual statute.
117
Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 96, at 1533.
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these views alone is sufficient.118 Similar outcomes are found in the Establishment Clause cases,
where the court has found state acts as unconstitutionally endorsing religion; such endorsement
is viewed as impermissible due to the fear of excluding members of society who do not adhere to
the particular religious views expressed or embraced.119 Criminal punishment, particularly
incarceration, have received support from expressive theories, which suggest that fines or
community service in lieu of prison terms does not sufficiently communicate the moral
condemnation to society that a loss of liberty through imprisonment can.120
Gays and lesbians have long endured laws which inflict expressive harms against
them.121 Sodomy laws were used to classify homosexuals as “criminals,” even if the laws were
never enforced.122 Until overturned by the Supreme Court, Colorado’s amendment to the state
constitution that prohibited cities and municipalities from providing civil rights protection for
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Id. at 1534; see Johnson, 2005 WL 415281, at *13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Such
musings inspire little confidence. Indeed, this comment supports the suspicion that the policy is
based on racial stereotypes and outmoded fears about the dangers of racial integration. This
Court should give no credence to such cynical, reflexive conclusions about race.”).
119
Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 96, at 1547. Whether those “nonadherents”
actually feel excluded is irrelevant. Id What is key is the governments communication of
endorsement which necessarily excludes those nonadherents. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends
the opposite message.”). Justice O’Connor’s views have begun to take hold in the Court’s
establishment jurisprudence. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union
Greater Pittsburgh, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989) (citing O’Connor’s concurrence favorably).
120
Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean? 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 605-30
(1996). But see Adler, supra note 98, at 1366-68 (discussing and criticizing this theory).
121
See generally Andrew Koppelman, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY
(1996).
122
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (“The State cannot demean their
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”); see also
Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by "Unenforced" Sodomy Laws,
35 HARVARD C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 104 (2000). Leslie correctly points out that sodomy laws
harmed gays and lesbians beyond expressive harms, such as providing a basis to deny child
custody to gay and lesbian parents and denial of certain employment opportunities. Id.
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gays and lesbians communicated a strong message of inferiority.123 The denial of the right to
marry also inflicts expressive harms – by being denied rights equal with those of heterosexuals,
homosexuals are relegated to second-class citizenship.124
Recent patent scholarship has shown that patents communicate information beyond
technical information regarding the invention.125 This subsection similarly explores the ability of
patents to communicate messages and signals, but of a non-pecuniary nature. The grant of a
patent could communicate government disdain towards various biologically-defined groups and
behaviors by stating that “curing” these people is normatively good. Indeed, the patent system
can be seen as facilitating privatized eugenics, a status of moral ambiguity. Now is the time to
consider the possible implications of these inevitable discoveries.126
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See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (“We must conclude that Amendment 2
classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to
everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to
its laws.”).
124
See Opinions of The Justices To The Senate, 440 Mass. 1201, 1207 (2004) (“The
dissimilitude between the terms ‘civil marriage’ and ‘civil union’ is not innocuous; it is a
considered choice of language that reflects a demonstrable assigning of same-sex, largely
homosexual, couples to second-class status.”); Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440
Mass. 309, 312 (2003) (“The question before us is whether . . . the Commonwealth may deny the
protections, benefits, and obligations conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the same
sex who wish to marry. We conclude that it may not. The Massachusetts Constitution affirms
the dignity and equality of all individuals. It forbids the creation of second-class citizens.”); see
also Bonnie Miller Rubin, Same-sex couples see some light, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 18, 2003,
at 30 ((“Every day, you face reminders that you’re a second-class citizen.”). Cf. Anderson &
Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 96, at 1533-45 (discussing expressivism in the context of equal
protection jurisprudence, noting that the creation of “second-class citizenship” is one of the
“most conventional expressive concerns.”).
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Long, supra note 7; Wagner & Parchomovsky, supra note 7; Heald, supra note 7, at 476.
126
FUKUYAMA, supra note 15, at 16 (“Technological prediction is notoriously difficult and
risky, particularly when talking about events that may still lie a generation or two away.
Nonetheless, it is important to lay out some scenarios for possible futures that suggest a range of
outcomes, some of which are very likely and even emerging today, and others which may never
in the end materialize.”).
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B.

Factors that Influence the Expressive Aspect of Patenting

No one has explored what expressive impact, if any, a patent could have. Currently, the
patent system is viewed as morally agnostic, making no judgments about the value of individual
patents. This perspective may need reconsideration in light of the biotechnology revolution. As
researchers discover genes that relate to behaviors, and not diseases, our traditional
understanding of the patent system will be tested. The relevant biological processes will
continue to be a focus of scientific investigation,127 and discoveries in this area certainly will be
the subject of future patent applications. For groups such as gays, the deaf, 128 dwarfs,129 and
high-functioning autistics, the granting of a patent risks communicating that they are inferior,
flawed members of society that should be cured130 or, potentially through prenatal testing or gene
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HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING, supra note 14, at 301 (“The combination of these two
forces – the stampede to map the genome plus the decisive role of genes in behavior – means
that, whether anyone thinks it’s a good idea or not, we soon will have the ability to change and
manipulate human behavior through genetics.”).
128
Comparisons between the experience of gays and the deaf have been made previously.
See ROSARIO, supra note 48, at 11 (“Analogous to the case of deaf children struggling to
consolidate an identity in a hearing family, most gays and lesbians lack familial role models for
developing a ‘homosexual identity’ if they grow up in a heterosexual household.”). Richard
Pillard poignantly explains the comparison:
I suppose most parents would not choose to have a gay child if they could choose
otherwise. Fortunately, that choice is not at hand, but similar choices are.
Deafness will soon be an example. Deafness is frequently genetic; approximately
thirty different genetic loci for deafness have been hypothesized. Many people see
deafness simply as a ‘handicap’ and could not imagine the slightest object to
reducing or eliminating it. But those born deaf have a linguistic and cultural
community, as precious to them as the gay community is to gays. The deaf, not
surprisingly, want control of their culture and resent the imperialistic assumptions
of the hearing majority.
PILLARD, supra note 22, at 238.
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See id. at 209 (“Something similar [to homosexuality] can be said of dwarfism: human
heights are distributed normally, and it is not clear at what point in the distribution one becomes
a dwarf.”).
130
FUKUYAMA, supra note 15, at 39 (“Scientific knowledge about causation will inevitably
lead to a technological search for ways to manipulate that causality.”).
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therapy, eliminated altogether.131 I will use homosexuality as the paradigm to explore this
expressive potential. The use of patents in the context of sexual orientation research is nearly a
foregone conclusion. Dean Hamer has already stated that, if he isolates a gay gene, he intends to
obtain intellectual property rights on it.132
What is consider “normal” versus “pathological,” while arguably objective scientifically,
is necessarily infected with moral and cultural values.133 This bias can readily be seen in the
context of sexual orientation: the search is for a “gay gene,” not “the sexual orientation gene,”
even though necessarily such a gene would be relevant in the development of a heterosexual
orientation as well as a homosexual one.134 No matter how objective any individual method or
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LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 23 (“[W]ill we develop the technology to
engineer homosexuality out of the human race, for example, and if so, should we be taking steps
to prevent this from happening.”).
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a way harmful to others. HAMER, supra note 78, at 219 (“Third, I would try to use the law to
withhold the ‘testing’ technology should it ever become available. Genetic testing as practiced
in the United States requires commercialization, and commercialization generally requires
protection of intellectual property through patents. If a lab does discover a ‘gay gene,’ it might
be able to control the licensing of the technology.”); see also ALLEN, supra note 34, at 227
(“[Hamer] also vowed to patent his genetic testing techniques to insure that they could not be
used in a discriminatory way.”). Of course a patent right is only temporary – at the end of the
term, anyone is free to use the invention. So, Hamer’s laudable objective could only be
temporarily realized.
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See ROSARIO, supra note 48, at 4 (“[T]he ‘normal’ and the ‘pathological’—in their very
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FAUSTO-STERLING, How to Build a Man, in SCIENCE AND HOMOSEXUALITIES 219, 224 (ed.
Vernon A. Rosario) (1997) (“Because they represent scientific findings, one might imagine that
they contain no preconceptions, no culturally instigated belief systems. But this turns out not to
be the case. Although based on evidence, scientific writing can be seen as a particular kind of
cultural interpretation—the enculturated scientist interprets nature.”); Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra
note 14, at 333 (noting “persons at risk” due to genetic condition as “people whose physical
condition removed them from the class of normalcy”).
134
LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 221 (“I have never heard of a single instance
of a heterosexual, whatever problems he may have been facing, inquiring about the nature and
origins of heterosexuality, or asking why he was a heterosexual, or considering these matters
important.” (quoting F.E. Kameny, Does research into homosexuality matter?, THE LADDER 1420 (1965)); LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 5 (“What should be emphasized, though,
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research may be, political and moral considerations will infect the results135 and, consequently,
impact the view a patent on such subject matter would have within the general population. Such
research is inextricably linked not only with what causes homosexuality but also with what it
means to be a homosexual.136 The medicalization of homosexuality in the past has been used to
stigmatize and marginalize homosexuals.137 The threat to these groups ofeugenic application of
these technologies to eliminate them is real.138 Eugenics conflates science with the moral.139

is that seeking the cause of homosexuality is really the same thing as seeking the cause of
heterosexuality. . . . If ‘gay genes’ make a person gay, then ‘straight genes’ make a person
straight. . . . When we study homosexuality we are inevitably studying heterosexuality also, even
if we do not always express it that way.” ); ALLEN, supra note 34, at 251 (“For another, if
homosexuality was not viewed as a pathology, then we cannot sensibly ask about its cause or
origins separate from the causes or origins of heterosexuality and sexual practices in general.”).
135
ROSARIO, supra note 48, at 12 (“Despite Hamer[sic, ‘s] and LeVay’s protests that
scientific research on homosexuality should and can be ‘objective’ and apolitical, it should be
clear that even if it adheres to the methods and standards of scientific correctness, such research
is inevitably interlaced with deeper narratives and hidden motivations that reflect the political
climate of the moment as well as the personal aspirations of individual researchers.”).
136
Id. at 14.
137
MARGARET GIBSON, Clitoral Corruption: Body Metaphors and American Doctors’
Constructions of Female Homosexuality 1870-1900, in SCIENCE AND HOMOSEXUALITIES 108,
108 (ed. Vernon A. Rosario) (1997) (“Through these connections, doctors were able to further
marginalize and exoticize the female invert or homosexual, and minimize the threat that the
existence of such individuals might pose to broader beliefs about sexuality, gender, and intimate
relationships.”); CARLSTON, supra note 1, at 175 (nothing that historians “have suggested how
damaging the internalization of [the concept of homosexuality as pathology and abnormal] could
be to people with homoerotic feelings or in homosexual relations.”).
138
Id. at 85 (“Hanging over the entire field of genetics has been the specter of eugenics –
that is, the deliberate breeding of people for certain selected heritable traits.”); ROSARIO, supra
note 48, at 6 ([T]he classification of homosexuality as abnormal or pathological does not exist in
an essential way within its examination by scientists, but is constructed from a complex
interaction of social values and individual researchers’ and subjects’ approaches, methods, and
presuppositions.”); LEVAY, SEXUAL BRAIN, supra note 67, at 171 (“On the one hand, this search
[for a gay gene], if successful, seems to promise the most direct support for a liberating ‘born
that way’ argument. On the other hand, it raises what is invariably described as the ‘specter of
Nazi eugenics’ – the possibility that attempts will be made to eliminate homosexuality through
genetic ‘therapy,’ through the selective destruction of fetuses that carry ‘gay genes,’ or through
sterilization of gay adults.”).
139
GIBSON, supra note 137, at 111-12 (“Social Darwinism and the start of the eugenics
movement provided a framework in which to discuss moral issues in an increasingly biological
29

Consequently, these technologies easily can be viewed not only as a threat to the human dignity
of gays and lesbians but also a threat to their existence140 Biological conversion technologies
will undoubtedly be protected by patents, and this eugenic potential informs the potential
expressive impact of granting patent rights in this area.
Investigation of factors relative to an expressive harms have never been discussed. For
legislation, the communication of the message was presumed: it was simply not relevant whether
the general populace was aware of a law being on the books. Statutes are public in nature and
thus tend to “‘stand out’ against the background of public discourse.”141 The nature of law as a
governmental act necessarily communicates something to the public. The content of every law,
of course, is not expressed to the public, but laws can permeate the public sphere in a variety of
ways – advertisement by the state, particular controversies surrounding a new law that are
reported in the media,142 and the potential for sanctions against third parties.143 Laws or
governmental communications, particularly those that impact people directly, are more likely to
have an expressive impact. Such an assumption may not be valid in the patent context, however.
This section will identify a variety of factors that influence the expressive potential of
patents. The first two of these factors are relevant to the threshold issue of whether patents can
send expressive signals at all. The remaining factors concern the strength of such a signal and

way, using the human body not just as a personal unit, but as a representation of the limits to
human progress and of regression into an animal past.”).
140
FUKUYAMA, supra note 15, at 39-40. Indeed, the LeVay findings regarding the brain in
fact already spurred anti-gay and lesbian groups to attempt conversion methods. LeVay, QUEER
SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 134.
141
Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649,
1666, 1668 (2000).
142
Patents in the biotech world have garnered media attention already. See infra note 162
and accompanying text.
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Id. at 1668-69.
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address the issue of whether any such signal may be lost in other “noise.” This expressive
message is a part of the communicative ability of patents.
1. TheGrant of a Patent as a Governmental Act – Are PatentsAkin to Statutes?
Generally, expressive theory has focused on statutes passed by governments, such as
sodomy laws or laws that discriminate on the basis of race, gender, or other categories.144
Commentators have also noted that expressive communications could occur through regulatory
agencies and even judges.145 Others have suggested that mere government communications that
fall short of a statute can serve a signaling function.146 What is key is a government
communication – via statute or other information –that transmits the expressive message to the
public. The question thus arises: is the grant of a patent akin to a statute or other form of
government communication?
Patents serve purposes beyond simply affording the inventors exclusive rights to their
inventions. They also serve to notify the public as to the scope of those rights, as well as
providing a disclosure to the public so that the know-how underlying the invention will enter the
public domain. Recent scholarship has demonstrated that patents can communicate information
beyond merely the extent of the inventor’s exclusive rights. Patents can serve as economic
signals to other entities about the innovative abilities and strength of a company.147 They can
also be used as a mechanism to reduce transaction costs between parties.148 These roles for
patents demonstrate that patents have a broader role in the public than the basic disclosure
obligations suggest. The main reason patents can serve such varied functions is because they are
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See, e.g., Anderson & Pildes, Expressive I, supra note 96, at 1533-64.
McAdams, supra note 141, at 1678-89.
See supra note 116.
See generally Long, supra note 7; Wagner and Gideon Parchomovsky, supra note 7.
See generally, Heald, supra note 7.
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grants of exclusive rights from the federal government. While technically legislation, the patent
grant can be viewed as akin to private legislation.149
Courts have compared patents to statutes previously, recognizing that they share common
features: “There can be only one correct interpretation of a statute that applies to all persons.
Statutes are written instruments that all persons are presumed to be aware of and are bound to
follow. Statutes, like patents, are enforceable against the public, unlike private agreements
between contracting parties.” 150 Thus, while a patent granted by an agency and not a enacted by
Congress, patents and statutes do share several similarities, particularly the function of
establishing rights of which the public is presumptively aware. These rights derive directly from
the federal government through the substantive review and grant afforded by the PTO.
Members of the public look to patents as a signal something beyond mere technical
information, such as signal of the firm’s innovativeness. There is no reason they cannot
communicate other, non-commercial messages. Previous experience demonstrates that, like
statutes, patents can communicate signals of morality. Controversies over biotechnology patents
confirm that the public does make the link between a patent and potential moral signaling from
the federal government.151 The public looks at what is being granted because the government is
giving its imprimatur on the disclosed invention.152 The patent system is in essence an incentive
system by the government to encourage innovation, innovation which in some circumstances
149

John R. Thomas, Liberty and Property in the Patent Law, 39 HOUSTON L. REV. 569, 582
(2002) (“Patents may be conceived as a sort of private legislation.”).
150
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),
aff’d 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
151
See Bagley, supra 12, at 473 (“The patent [on cloning products], and news reports of
other human cloning activity, drew critical reaction, commentary, and calls for legislative action
from a variety of sources.”).
152
Id. at 475-76 (acknowledging that, while banning patents on morally controversial
subject matter will not halt research in those areas, “the availability of a government imprimatur
granting exclusive rights over morally inventions is a separate but important issue as well”).
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may be of morally questionable subject matter.153 The grant of the patent informs the public that
the government has deemed the disclosed invention as worthy of the governmentally granted
right to exclude.
Patents undisputedly can serve as the government’s “stamp of approval.” Patents can
“legitimate novel technologies and the theories that they apply.”154 They can “validate
inventions” of questionable scientific credibility.155 The same impact could be had on morally
questionable inventions—the patent validates these inventions as legitimate, ethical science.
Because the patent is awarded by the government after careful review, it communicates that this
morally questionable subject matter has legitimacy.
The salience of this position is clearer if patents are considered as a form of government
subsidy.156 Few would deny that the federal government has the ability (and perhaps the
obligation) to deny direct funding to morally objectionable research. We do not want our tax
money going into research that is offensive. A patent is effectively indirect federal funding: the
government’s grant of the patent requires the public to pay for the invention due to the exclusive
rights afforded under the patent. Therefore, denying patent protection (while paradoxically
allowing the use of the invention to be even more widespread157) does seem reasonable. The
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See Mark Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
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If patent protection is denied, then no one has the right to exclude others from practicing
the invention. Unless held as a trade secret, the technology becomes free for others to practice.
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to use the technology free of liability. Denial of patent protection, however, lessens the incentive
to engage in such research, so there might be some slowing of development in a morally
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same would be the case if the government simply was distributing research grants: denial of
funds would not stop research into the technological area, but likely would slow such research
while also expressing government concerns with the technology. The recent denials of federal
funding on stem cell research exemplifies the reality that government subsidies are laced with
moral considerations.158
The mere grant of a patent – independent of the whether the technology develops –
implicates moral concerns. Passed in an appropriations bill in 2004, the Weldon Amendment
precludes the PTO from using any of its funds to issue a patent with “claims directed to or
encompassing a human organism.”159 Congressman Dave Weldon was concerned with the
commodification of humanity, where “technology can be used to undermine what is meant to be
human, including the exploitation of human nature for the purpose of financial gain.”160
Weldon noted that “[j]ust because something can be done does not mean that it should be
done. . .We should not allow such researchers to gain financially by granting them an exclusive
right to practice such ghoulish research.”161 Significantly, and paradoxically to some, denying
patents, or precluding their issuance due to funding limitations, will not stop the creation of such
technology. Patent denial means that anyone who develops the technology will be free to use it,
absent regulatory or legal restraints on such technologies that arise outside of the patent laws.
The band does remove the government-provided incentive to develop such technologies. Thus,

questionable area, just as denial of federal funds would slow, although not stop, research into
certain areas. The recent stem cell controversies are exemplary of this dynamic.
158
See Christopher Robertson, Recent Developments in the Law and Ethics of Embryonic
Research: Can Science Resolve the Ethical Problems it Creates?, 33 J. L., MED., & ETHICS 384,
384 (2005). I personally disagree with this decision.
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H.R. 2673, Pub. L. No. 108-199; see PTO Issues Patent on Methods for Cloning
Mammals, May Run Afoul of Law, 68 BNA’S PATENT, TRADEMARK, & COPYRIGHT JOURNAL
485, 486 (Aug. 27, 2004).
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fears and objections to patenting humans, therefore, must be rooted in something broader – the
idea that patents can express government endorsement of morally objectionable technologies.162
Similar concerns with the ability of patents to communicate a message of moral
endorsement of technologies by governments is apparent in international patent treaties. The
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) allows signatories to
exclude from patentability inventions on the basis of morality and the ordre public.163 Because
the denial of a patent would not prevent these morally objectionable technologies from
developing, these provisions serve only to eliminate the signaling problem. Other incentives
operate to encourage scientists to develop such technologies, as can be seen in the context of
cloning humans. Thus, the only purpose for such exclusions is to allow governments to avoid
granting the patent on these controversial inventions and to avoid the government’s imprimatur.
The public has already become aware of controversial patents, confirming the ability of
individual patents to communicate information to the public-at-large. There has been
considerable media coverage of, and outcry against, the patenting of animals, genes, and humans
generally.164 As such, patents could serve to communicate a message to the public, both gay and
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religious groups, and some members of Congress.”).
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straight, that gays and lesbians are inferior or defective in some sense. In light of the public
nature of patent rights and the already demonstrated ability of patents to transmit information
beyond simply explaining the scope of exclusive rights, patents can have affects similar to that as
legislation, including expressive impacts.
2. The Utility Standard—Does a Patent Inform Us what is Normatively “Good”?
While patents and the inventions disclosed therein can intersect with morally
questionable subject matter, the key aspect of an expressive harm is from the government’s
assessment that an invention is “good” and worthy of a patent. This element is the utility
standard of patent law. An invention must have utility in order to be eligible for patent
protection. 165 Generally, the utility requirement is easy to satisfy: an invention will be useful “if
it actually works to achieve at least one of its stated purposes.”166 The inventor must
demonstrate that the invention has only one use that benefits society, even if there are numerous
other uses that would be detrimental. The courts and PTO generally use the utilityrequirement
to reject inventions that belie scientific laws, such as a perpetual motion machine.167 Only in the
chemical context is utility really an issue – the mere knowledge of a chemical structure is
insufficient for a patent unless a use for the chemical is known. For mechanical devices, utility
is rather simple to demonstrate – the mousetrap either snaps closed or it does not. The PTO
recently issued guidelines for establishing utility to deal with complications arising from the
patenting of human genes and gene fragments. The standard set in the guidelines is that an
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Gitter, supra note 35, at 1662-63.
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invention must have a substantial, specific, and credible utility to be eligible for patent
protection.168
Historically, the utility requirement also contained a morality component: inventions
viewed as immoral lacked utility per se and were ineligible for patent protection.169 For
example, the PTO at one time viewed patents on gambling machines as ineligible for patent
protection because their only use was immoral.170 Moral utility appears to be withering away.171
In Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc.,172 the Federal Circuit reversed the judgment of the
district court, which had concluded the invention lacked utility because its sole purpose was to
deceive consumers.173 The Federal Circuit distinguished Justice Storie’s morality-based view of
utility. Noting that this principle “has not been applied broadly in recent years,”174 the court
concluded that there was “no basis in section 101 to hold that inventions can be ruled
unpatentable for lack of utility simply because they have the capacity to fool some members of
the public.”175
Consistent with this amoral approach to the utility, the PTO has rejected all moralitybased arguments against patenting human genes. Specifically, the PTO rejected the argument
that “patents should not issue for genes because the sequence of the human genome is at the core
168
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of what it means to be human and no person should be able to own/control something so
basic.”176 The PTO reasoned that genes, as a discovery,177 are patentable so long as they satisfy
the statutory requirements for obtaining a patent – novelty, non-obviousness, utility, and the
disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112.178 Because patents “do not confer ownership of
genes, genetic information, or sequences,” but instead only the right to exclude others from
utilizing the invention,179 the risk of an entity “owning” someone else’s genes is unfounded.180
The PTO’s approach is neutral and scientifically objective: the PTO will apply the statutory
standards without regard to the moral implications of the underlying invention.
Utility is an inherently relative concept, however. One person’s invention on a drug
delivery system could be another person’s suicide machine. The patent laws do not define the
proper population segment by which utility must be addressed. The “at least one use” standard
would seem to include small, discrete populations. The utility guidelines do not elucidate as to
whom that one benefit must inure. Is it society as whole? If a patented invention could be used
harshly against one segment – perhaps a minority – should that be viewed as useful, even if the
benefit afforded to the majority is slight? Is there an implicit cost/benefit analysis that should be
performed, in that the benefit to society as a whole must be greater than the cost to society, or is
merely one benefit, regardless of other potential costs, sufficient? Present PTO law seems to
176
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suggest the latter – there need be only one use, regardless of the harms from the invention and
indeed regardless of whether the harms outweigh the benefits. No policy balancing takes place.
As an administrative matter, the lack of balancing may make sense. The PTO is not in a
position to assess the all of the potential consequences of a given invention, whereas, through the
disclosures of the patentee, they are in a relatively good position to assess the benefits. Thus,
administratively, the lack of a balancing approach may be efficient.181 As patents continue to
issue on genes and other aspects of humankind that implicate who we are, as opposed to what we
do, then perhaps reconsideration of the lack of balancing is appropriate, particularly as
discoveries are made that relate to non-pathological conditions.
To demonstrate this concern, this article will consider as a thought experiment the
implications of patenting a method of altering sexual orientation. Suppose that a scientist invents
a method of changing the sexual orientation of a patient from gay to straight. Such a conversion
suggests that homosexuality is pathological and should be remedied.182 The question is whether
a method to convert a homosexual to a heterosexual satisfies the utility requirement of patent law
and accordingly be patentable. To some in the heterosexual community, a method to convert
gays to straights might be viewed as useful. It would maintain the status of heterosexuality as
the norm and, for those who are opposed to gay rights, it would provide a basis for objecting to
legal protections for gays and lesbians. In the extreme, there would be a risk of forced
participation in conversion programs by parents, particularly of under age gays and lesbians, or

181

Cf. Mark Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 N W. U.. L. REV. 1495
(2001) (arguing that, given the few patents actually litigated or licensed, devoting more resources
to the review of patents at the Patent Office would be wasteful).
182
See Larry Thompson, Search for a Gay Gene, TIME 60-61 (June 12, 1995) (“The Rev.
Louis P. Sheldon, president of the Traditional Values Coalition in Anaheim, California, says that
if a biological cause of homosexuality is found, then ‘we would have to come up with some
reparative therapy to correct that genetic defect.’”).
39

for the use of the technology in utero. Gays and lesbians would be further marginalized because
there status would now no longer be immutable.
Now suppose that a method to alter sexual orientation is discovered, but the effected
conversion is only from straight to gay. Would the patent system view this invention has
satisfying the utility requirement?. The answer may hinge on the relative nature of the utility
requirement. From the perspective of the majority, homosexuality is not the norm and thus such
a conversion would not be useful. This approach would feed the fears of the majority of a
systemic “conversion” campaign by gays and lesbians to recruit straight people into their ranks.
Conservative organizations would never stand for a grant of exclusive rights for changing a
person into a gay or lesbian, and in the current political environment, the issuance of such a
patent seems highly unlikely. From the perspective of gays and lesbians, however, such an
invention could be useful. A gay or lesbian couple who is having a child, for example, may
prefer to have a gay or lesbian child as well. To the extent that parents want to see themselves in
their children, some gay or lesbian parents may prefer to have a homosexual child.183
The utility standard in this case is more perplexing, even though the genetics or
biological pathways involved with this hypothetical likely are the same as the first scenario. The
biological processes creating predispositions towards homosexuality also likely implicate
predispositions to heterosexuality. The benefit here would accrue only to a small segment of
society, although the benefit to thatsmall segment could be immense. The majority would
seemingly be unharmed, although strong political and moral resistance to such technology, and
the patent itself, would be likely.
183
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Nevertheless, the patentability of a method to convert heterosexuals seems in serious
doubt. This point is even more salient if one considers the other groups implicated by the
potential expressive harms from patents, the deaf, dwarfs, and high-functioning autistics. For
example, deaf parents very well may prefer to have a deaf child, so such an invention allowing
them to have a genetically deaf child could be useful to them. It seems highly unlikely, however,
that the PTO would view an invention that ensures a deaf child would be viewed as useful,
notwithstanding the value to the parents.
The patentability of these two conversion hypotheticals is not the only relevant
consideration in assessing the potential impact the patent system could have. The relative
patentability of these two scenarios also merits contemplation. If the patent office were to grant
a patent on one but not the other, what would be the implications for the patent system and
society? A modification of this thought-experiment elucidates the potential consequences of this
concern. Given the two possible scenarios – a method to change gays to straights or straights to
gays (or, to make people hear and make them deaf, to make them dwarfs or of statistically
normal height, etc)., four permutations for Patent Office action follow: (1) grant patents for both
transformations; (2) deny patents for both; (3) allow patent protection for the transformation
from straight-to-gay (or hearing-to-deaf, etc.); and (4) allow patent protection only for reverse
transformation (gay-to-straight; deaf-to-hearing, etc.).

Grant Both

Differential Grant #1

Grant patent on Gay-to-Straight

Grant patent on Gay-to-Straight

Grant patent on Straight-to-Gay

Deny patent on Straight-to-Gay

Differential Grant #2

Deny both
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Deny patent on Gay-to-Straight

Deny patent on Gay-to-Straight

Grant patent on Straight-to-Gay

Deny patent on Straight-to-Gay

a)

Grant Patents on Both Gay-to-Straight and Straight-to-Gay

The first permutation is if the PTO were to allow claims covering methods for conversion
in either direction. If the PTO were to grant a patent on both, then the expressive impact would
be more limited. Under this scenario, the Patent Office would interpret the utility requirement to
reflect the value that either scenario would have to the respective groups. This would be a true
application of the “single benefit to one” approach that is ostensibly the current rule. The grant
of the patent here arguably is morally neutral and would not be construed as suggesting that the
government views heterosexuality as superior to homosexuality.
This seemingly neutral approach could communicate a negative expressive message
nevertheless. While it is true that under this scenario the patent would seem to express
indifference towards either straights or gays, the societal context must be considered.

The

neutrality of the invention, and its corresponding patent, may not negate the marginalization of
the technology:
a heterosexual child might be preferable for reasons that might appear most
salient to homosexuals themselves in lieu of the discrimination they have
encountered. The use of a technology by people against whom it may
discriminate (even if they attempt to use it to their benefit) does not establish its
neutrality.184
Thus, even a facially neutral technology can be discriminatory; similarly, the grant of an
apparently neutral patent can still express a message of discrimination and marginalization to the
relevant groups. The concern for these marginalized communities could very well be that the
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technology, notwithstanding its seeming neutral face, will be used disproportionately against
them. Given the construct surrounding the gay gene – there is never talk of a “straight” gene or a
more generic “sexual orientation gene” – the most likely scenario would be that the only
application would be towards the gay gene. The “utility” standard would be satisfied,
reinforcing the idea that homosexuality is outside the norm and akin to a pathological condition.
So, the seemingly neutral “grant to both” may yet inflict an expressive harm.
b) Grant Patents on Neither
Another option to consider would be that the PTO rejects all variations of the invention,
deeming them as lacking utility. The PTO could alternatively decline to issue patents on these
processes, resulting in a minimal expressive impact. Of course, the PTO must have a basis to
reject these applications. Seemingly the only basis for rejecting both would be on a morality
ground, which is disfavored under present law.
A recent rejection at the PTO office, however, suggests that use of morality may yet
resurface at the PTO, offering the potential for rejection of both inventions. An examiner at the
PTO recently rejected an application directed to animal-human chimeras, and one of the bases
for this rejection was utility.185 In her utility analysis, the examiner did not limit her
consideration to scientific or industrial usefulness. Instead, she distinguished the Federal
Circuit’s seeming evisceration of moral utility in Juicy Whip and drew upon Justice Story’s
formulation.186 The examiner acknowledged that “[t]he question of whether humans should be
subject of exclusive patent rights raises grave issues going to the core of what a ‘useful’
185
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invention is.”187 In embracing the utility standard in the patent statute, Congress was
presumptively aware of the moral utility doctrine and “did not disavow” it. The examiner
recognized that utility in this context is one of public policy, one that “takes into account the
common sense of the community.”188
As such, the examiner concluded that Congress, not the PTO, should be the first to
address this public policy issue and that, for the PTO to grant such a patent, would “usurp the
power of Congress to speak first to these issues.”189 She expressly recognized that “utility,” as
simply a technical standard, is one infected with public policy:
The discretion to consider the well-being and good policy of society implicit in
the statutory term “useful” is properly applied when a refusal to grant a patent is
necessary to avoid preempting the power of Congress to define essential questions
of public policy. . . .[T]he USPTO would be acting improperly in the pace of
Congress to “fill a gap” in the law if it were to grant a patent covering human
beings; it acts pursuant to soundly based deference to the constitutionally
empowered institutions of government in denying such a patent application.190
Thus, in this context, the examiner recognized that “utility” is infused with public policies
concerns and that consideration of the “community” (whoever that community may be) is
important. Technically, however, these observations are only those of one particular examiner
and do not establish PTO policy. Given the intense public scrutiny given this particular
application, however, it seems highly likely that policymakers at the PTO were involved in
drafting the office action. The PTO therefore has plausible deniability – while effectively an
expression of policy by the PTO, it is legally only the views of one examiner which cannot be
used to bind the entire PTO, if the PTO decides to change its stance. Additionally, the idea of
denying the patent in order to allow Congress to consider the issue first is inconsistent with the
187
188
189
190
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Supreme Court’s reasoning in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, where the court allowed the patenting of
a life form and noted that it is for the courts to decide patent eligibility in the first instance.191
At a minimum, however, this language shows that the PTO is indeed aware of the
relativity of utility. Its reference to “community” seems to mean the entire U.S. society, but
necessarily communities can be of varying sizes. What is useful to one community seemingly
may not be useful, and indeed may be harmful, to another. Thus, the PTO could root a decision
denying patent protection on all forms of such “conversion” technologies. The flat out denial of
patent protection would send a rather sharp expressive message that such eugenic-like
technologies are not properly within the ambit of the patent system.
c) Differential grant #1: Grant Patent Only on Gay-to-Straight
The use of the morality lever could cut in a much more hostile manner towards gays and
lesbians. The Patent Office could treat such processes differently and afford patent protection
for only gay-to-straight conversions or a methods of preventing homosexuality. Granting
technologies in this discriminatory manner undeniably would inflict a clear expressive harm to
homosexuals. The “usefulness” of the patent is to cure homosexuals, reinforcing the view that
gays are pathologically flawed. Given the role of patents as showing the affording the
imprimatur of the government, these grants would imply that U.S. government views
technologies that convert gays to straight as normatively good. The same would be true for the
other relevant groups—that we view those communities as flawed in a way that needs to be
corrected. This reality is very stark in the context of the deaf and other biologically-influenced
groups, where patents on technologies to cure deafness would send a signal to these groups that
191
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they should be cured. If the PTO were to explicitly allow patent protection only for these
methods of curing, then there would be considerable expressive consequences.
d) Differential grant #2: Grant Patent Only on Straight-to-Gay
The final option in this thought experiment is that the PTO would issue patents only on
straight-to-gay conversions or the prevention of heterosexuality – in other words, “cures” for
heterosexuality. If the PTO granted a patent on such a method, then value to the gay and lesbian
community under this view would be recognized. A positive message would be sent that
recognizes that some members of this community may want to have offspring that share their
genetic trait. The odds that the Patent Office would indeed allow such a grant seems slim, if not
impossible given the political consequences of such an act. This point again is more poignantly
made if we consider the deaf or autistics. It seems unlikely that the PTO would view as “useful”
processes to guarantee the birth of a deaf or highly-functioning autistic child.
These four scenarios afford considerable insight on the potential expressive harms from
granting patents in this area. Looking at these four possible scenarios, the possibility of
expressive harm is reduced if the two processes are treated the same – denying protection on
both or granting protection for both. These scenarios are of course hypothetical: they assume
that the PTO would actually be presented with patent applications for both processes
simultaneously.
The reality is, however, that the current system on its face offers no opportunity for
balancing such concerns, but the PTO’s own words in the human-animal chimera application
show that it is aware of this issue and is willing to rely upon community concerns and morality in
assessing utility. Its objectivity therefore is over-stated, and the concerns about differential
grants of patents involving sexual orientation therefore have considerable traction.
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3. The Nature and Scope of the Claim
The first two factors – whether patents are like statutes and the utility standard – are
essential in assessing whether any expressive communication could emanate from the grant of a
patent at all. The remaining factors relate more to the strength of such a signal and whether the
expressive message could be lost in other noise.
One key aspect of any communication would be the nature of the disclosed invention
itself and the scope of the patent’s right to exclude. A patent claim can be directed to a process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.192 Machines and manufactures generally are
not implicated for inventions relating to biology. Whether the invention is a process or method,
in contrast to a composition of matter, could affect the extent of an expressive message
significantly. The above hypothetical helps demonstrate this point. If the invention is a method
to alter or modify sexual orientation, the expressive impact would be greater, whereas a claim to
a gene or protein that influences sexual orientation would be more ambiguous. A method claim
must identify a particular outcome, which would highlight the purpose of the invention. Method
claims therefore would inflict expressive harms more directly.
In contrast, a claim for a composition of matter only coversthe structure of that
compound. The specification will have to identify a use for the compound, but a biological
materials often can have multiple functions.193 Originally, scientists believed the human genome
could contain upwards of 80,000 genes.194 This number, thanks to the Human Genome Project,
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has proven to be a gross overestimation. The current estimate is around 25,000 genes.195 The
consequence of this relatively small set of genes is that a single gene performs numerous
functions.196 Genes that implicate sexual orientation may be relevant in other biological
processes. The expressive impact of a patent that discloses both a function related to sexual
orientation as well as one unrelated to orientation could differ from that of a patent directed
solely to a gay gene. Particularly, suppose the claim is merely to a gene with a given sequence,
and the specification discloses a variety of functions, one of which happens to be influencing
sexual orientation. The expressive message would seem to be muted in that context given the
multiplicity of function.
The level of muting, however, would not be significant. While a compound claim may
not produce as strong of a signal as a method claim, a claim to a biological product influencing
sexual orientation would still likely provide a strong signal given the cultural and social context
of homosexuality. The fact remains that one reason the patent on this gene is considered useful
is that it influences sexual orientation, again suggesting that such knowledge and the potential to
modify such genes is a societal good. The mere pursuit of this scientific inquiry is infected with
prejudice and homophobia.197 As one commentator has noted, “there hasn’t been one instance in
history where the results of etiologic sexual orientation research have not been used against gay
people. On the contrary, virtually every ‘cause’ of homosexuality has been accompanied by
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attempts to ‘heal’ gay people.”198 Investigations into the biological origins is not truly valueneutral given the context of gays and lesbians in today’s society because “the very motivation for
seeking the ‘origin’ of homosexuality has its source within social frameworks that are
pervasively homophobic.”199 Thus, even a patent on the gene itself, although arguably neutral in
application because it could affect both gay and straight sexual orientation, is pregnant with an
expression of marginalization given the homophobic context of society.
Where this issue may be more important may not be the question of whether there is an
expressive communication, but whether or not to do anything about such communication given
that the gene has other uses aside from influencing sexual orientation.200 We may simply
conclude that, given the complexity of genetic science, parsing patent rights on possible
expressive harms simply is not worth it.
4. Who is the Inventor or the Owner?
Unlike legislation, the PTO can only pass judgment on the applications presented to it by
inventors. This begs the question of whether the identity of the inventor could serve to mitigate
or exacerbate an expressive signal from the granting of a patent. For example, because Hamer is
sympathetic to gay and lesbian causes, arguably his obtaining a patent on the gay gene would not
deliver as harsh of an expressive impact. In contrast, if someone from NARTH, a group of
psychiatrists who still view homosexuality as a pathological disorder, were to discover a gay
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gene, the expressive impact could be even more harmful. The motivation behind the inventor’s
technology would differ, and the resulting communication from the patenting of the technology
could vary depending on the inventor’s intent behind developing it.
Overall, inventor identity likely would not have a significant impact on the strength of the
signal. The expressive theory articulated here suggests the harm is originated by the
government’s grant of the patent. As such, the identity of the inventor may not matter—the
government has expressed its view that a gay gene satisfies the utility requirement,
notwithstanding its relative nature. The mere existence of the patent emphasizes the view of
gay-as-pathology. Moreover, the inventor’s interest in keeping the invention out of unscrupulous
hands is almost impossible to maintain. She may have the right to exclude others, but the
information surrounding her invention is disclosed to the public. Indeed, once the patent has
expired, anyone can use this information, including NARTH. The inventor’s lack of control over
the information, and eventually the invention itself, also suggests that the identity of the inventor
may not have a significant effect on the expressive impact.
In fact, it is likely that the identity of the inventor will be irrelevant to the gay and lesbian
community:
In addition, the fact that the current wave of scientists working in the area are either
themselves, or are well disposed to gay people, tends to diminish anxiety that the
research is intended to harm the gay community. Nevertheless, some gays and
lesbians still express fear that science is likely to harm them, whatever the sympathies
of the scientists themselves.201
Thus, the identity of the inventor or owner would have little bearing on the expressive harm
resulting from the grant of the patent.
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5. The Nature of the Characteristic at Issue
The potential for expressive harms from patents will also depend on how closely the
behavior or condition is associated with a person’s identity. For homosexuals, generally the link
between their orientation and their identity is strong and intimate. Similarly, other conditions
where the link between behavior/condition and identity are strong could include the deaf and
dwarfism, where these communities do not view their condition as necessarily pathological or in
need of curing. Other conditions may not have as strong of a link to identity. A patent on
aggression, for example, would not generate an expressive harm because most people to not
define themselves as an individual through their aggressiveness. Other possible conditions –
such as obesity – might fall somewhere in the middle of the identity spectrum. At some point,
though, such as discovery genes that affect certain ethnic groups more particularly, the
significant impact of the disease may outweigh expressive consequences of the patent itself. In
fact, concepts of race and ethnic origin may become more strongly implicated as exploration of
genetic differences between people continue.
C. Assessing the Potential for Expressive Harms from Patents
As genetic and biological research shifts away from conditions that are indisputably
pathological, patents in this area will increasingly bear on what is considered to be good,
particularly due to patent laws utility requirement. The above analysis shows that there is
considerable potential for expressive harms to result from the granting of patents in these
controversial areas. As with any sort of signal, the strength of the signal may vary.202 The fact
that signal strength may vary, though, does not undermine the fact that the signal exists. There
almost certainly will be some sort of message of inferiority or pathology communicated to the
groups impacted by these technological developments. The message is that the government,
202
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through the grant of a patent, believes that technologies that may help eliminate these conditions,
and therefore these groups, is normatively good. In essence, the government is approving
privatized eugenics.

IV. PRESCRIPTIVE OPTIONS TO REMEDY THESE EXPRESSIVE CONSEQUENCES
While expressive harms in patent law likely will occur, the mere presence of a harm does
not mean necessarily that we should deny patent protection in these contexts. The harms are a
cost – albeit a non-economic one203 – that would need to be weighed against other potential
benefits. In some contexts, such as sexual orientation, the benefit of any patent seems low, while
expressive harm seems high. If the risk of expressive harm is viewed as significant, we must
explore other options to eliminate that harm. For the blind, deaf, dwarfs, and autistics, the reality
very well may be that the agnostic approach of “granting both” likely will not come to pass.
This Section of the article will explore possible means to address the potential expressive impact
of patents, evaluating the benefits and downsides to each approach. As this section will show,
none of the solutions are perfect and each imposes its own consequences.
A. Do Nothing – Maintain the Status Quo Neutral Approach Towards Morality
The most obvious option would be to do nothing. It might very well be that the cost
imposed by the expressive harm is not sufficient to require an alteration to the patent system in
any significant way. The various factors above demonstrate that, while communication of a
message is likely, the strength of that signal may be contingent on numerous factors. As such,
the communication may be so muted as to not merit changing the status quo. If the Patent Office
maintains its agnostic approach and would allow patents for both conversions from gay-to-
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straight or straight-to-gay, then the expressive impact would be significantly reduced. If,
however, the Patent Office does not treat both as equal, as likely would be the case in the context
of the blind, deaf, or autistics, then the message would be fairly strong. Maintaining a truly
morally neutral approach, and not discriminating on the technology, would be key to minimizing
the expressive harm and therefore requiring no change in policy.
Patents on inventions that some find objectionable seemingly have not created significant
moral expressions in the past. For example, there are patents on methods of performing
abortions, which clearly would implicate messages of the government embracing certain
technologies.204 Admittedly, these inventions are not directly related to identity the way that
patents on sexual orientation or other behaviors may be, but the argument would be that society
has weathered patents on controversial technologies previously and can continue to do so. The
burden of fleshing out those technologies that are creating such a harm is not worth the cost.
B. Cease Issuing Patents on Human Genes and Gene Fragments
If one concludes, however, that the harm inflicted on these groups is significant and
should be addressed, one approach would be to deny patents on all inventions that relate to
human genes. Others have called for a similar ban because patents inhibit innovation205 or that
genes are naturally occurring substances ineligible for patent protection.206 The potential for
expressive consequences adds another basis for objecting to these types of patents.
This approach, however, is both over- and under-inclusive in resolving the possibility of
expressive harms. A complete ban on gene patents would eliminate protection not only for those
204
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patents with the potential for an expressive harm but also those that are genuinely directed to
conditions that need to be cured, such as various cancers or schizophrenia. A complete ban
would thus be an overly inclusive solution, and indeed might create more harm than good by
eliminating the patent incentive for research into areas that undeniably relate to pathological
conditions.
A ban, moreover, would be underinclusive. As the discussion of the biology of
homosexuality demonstrated, many behavioral characteristics may not be genetically determined
but instead may be influenced by non-genetic, biological situations, such as in utero hormone
levels. The burgeoning field of proteomics further shows that the expression of a trait may be
controlled not only at the genetic level but also at the protein level. A ban on gene patents alone,
therefore, still permit patents on various proteins and biological processes, which still has the
potential to create an expressive harm. Moreover, methods of curing would also seem to escape
a proscription on gene patents. Thus, while the potential expressive harms from patents adds
some additional support to recent calls to stop granting patents on human genes and gene
fragments, this approach would not adequately solve the problem.

C. Allow the PTO to Assess Whether the Expressive Impact Outweighs Benefits of
Granting the Patent
Another possibility would be to allow the PTO or the courts to assess the expressive
impact of a patent in assessing the patent’s validity. The PTO would seem to be on the front
lines, as they will first encounter these patents with expressive or eugenic potential. Examiners,
however, are persons with technical skills and not necessarily ethical training. They would be
ill-equipped to grapple with the ethical assessments that these applications may present. The
PTO could establish an ethics board to deal with these issues or other morally questionable
inventions. While not a panacea, examiners could flag inventions that raise expressive potential,
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which could be reviewed by such a board. The board, to avoid the appearance of bias, could be
formed of persons not employed by the PTO directly.
Of course, ironically, in trying to assess any potential expressive impact from a given
patent, the PTO would be memorializing and in fact confirming an expressive consideration of
patent law. The PTO would be saying “yes, we view this as lacking utility or having utility”
with consideration for expressive harms. This solution could prove to be worse than the
problem.
The courts could also reinvigorate the now-moribund morality exclusion, and allow for
consideration of expressive harms. The courts, however, may not be in the best position to make
such assessments. Indeed, given that the groups who are likely harmed by some patents would
likely never be infringers themselves, obtaining standing to challenge such patents would be a
problem.
D.

Define “Utility” as Covering Genes and Biological Processes Relating to
Pathological Conditions—Patents for Therapy, not Enhancement

A cleaner, morally neutral approach would for there to be a change in the utility standard,
either pursuant to Congress or the PTO. An invention relating to human biology would have
utility only if it served to identify or correct a truly pathological condition. While on the margins
of what constitutes “pathological” could create some difficulty, such a condition would could be
tied to the medical professions views of what is viewed as disease or pathology. Moral
considerations would be minimized, and those inventions that relate more to behavior and or
identity would be excluded from patent protection.
A potential source for identifying what constitutes “pathological” would be the medical
community. Psychiatrists and psychologists, for example, use the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in assessing whether a patient has a pathological mental
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health condition.207 Thus, the DSM acts as a catalog of conditions that are viewed as
pathological, and those that are not. Thus, the field of medicine, and particularly the DSM,
would be a helpful tool in assessing whether a condition is pathological and therefore should be
eligible for patent protection. This approach could also be articulated as the “therapy versus
enhancement” approach – protection will be provided for those genetic and biological inventions
that relate to therapies for diseases but not for mere enhancements.208
There are also problems with this approach. The line therapy/pathology and enhancement line is
far from clear. The DSM itself has proven to be a fluid reference – it has changed over time, and
conditions within it continually change. For example, the DSM lists Attention deficithyperactivity disorder (ADHD) as a disease and prescribes the use of drugs to treat this
condition.209 But this pathology is recognized only by its symptoms, which are arguably simply
the tail end of a normal distribution of attention levels of children.210 Arguably, this is not a case
of using drugs to cure a pathology – a therapy – but instead to enhance the attention level of
individuals.211
What constitutes pathological is often infected by social and cultural norms, not simply
medical knowledge. The most obvious example is homosexuality itself. As discussed above,
until the early 1970s, the medical community, with considerable internal debate, did consider
homosexuality to be pathological. Nothing changed in the 1970s with respect to homosexuality
207
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– instead social norms and views of homosexuals changed with in the medical community,
resulting in it being eliminated as a pathological condition.212 The contextual nature of
psychological disorders, therefore, may result in an ever-moving target of what constitutes
pathological.
The medical line of therapy/enhancement could truly break down in the context of the
deaf, dwarfs, and high-functioning autistics. The deaf do not view themselves as medically
pathological, although the hearing community would view them as lacking one of the key human
senses and, thus, possessing a pathological condition. The medical community would seem to be
more in line with that of the hearing community, risking that the use of a medical norm would
allow patents that arguably would express disfavor to the deaf community. A similar argument
could be made for dwarfs, who have bodies that function entirely normally. They are simply
statistically far outside the normal range of human height. High- functioning autistics can view
themselves as simply having different social skills, which is not inherently wrong. Arguably,
this should not be viewed as a pathological condition, but likely the medical community would
disagree.
Simply because these distinctions are difficult to make, however, does not inevitably
mean that we should allow everything to be patented. Regulatory agencies other than the PTO
are charged with making this distinction already.213 The PTO could be require the demonstration
of a utility that is beyond mere enhancement and one that instead is a therapy directed to a
known pathology. The DSM could remain an effective tool, however. While on the margins
some conditions may seem close to the line of pathology, there are some conditions that
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universally would be viewed as pathological, such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. The
DSM would at least provide certainty for certain behaviors.
Currently there is no legal basis for limiting the pathological/enhancement distinction to
gene-related, biological-related, or behaviorally-related inventions. Indeed, under international
obligations, countries must not discriminate on the basis of technological area, other than the
exceptions provided for in TRIPS.214 Consequently, the redefinition of utility would apply in
other contexts, including to basic pharmaceuticals. Patent protection for things like Viagra or
Claritin might not be eligible for patent protection under the therapy/enhancement dichotomy.
Whether this possibility is good or bad as a policy matter, however, bears further exploration.
The pharmaceutical industry has come under criticism recently for failing to devote
sufficient resources to particularly relevant drugs, instead focusing on the next generation of
market-driven (as opposed to health-care driven) drugs such as antihistamines. A recent study
has shown that most new drugs entering the market are not particularly innovative and instead
are simply follow-on improvements on already existing drugs.215 There are a number of reasons
for this reality: the dependency on drug companies on blockbuster drugs;216 the ability of
companies to extend patent protection effectively on blockbusters through patent and FDA laws
and regulations;217 and the reduced cost of relying on known drugs in proving safety and
efficacy.218 Innovation in the pharmaceutical market thus seems anchored to existing drugs,
many of which are more driven towards enhancement as opposed to curing pathologies.
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A new utility standard, therefore, would reduce incentives for companies to spend money
on “lifestyle” drugs and instead create greater incentive for pharmaceuticals and other companies
to research drugs and biologics directed to more severe conditions. With availability of patents
curtailed, companies would not have the patent rights to recoup their sunk research and
development costs. The ex ante incentive to research drugs that deal with lifestyle would
therefore be dramatically reduced, affording the opportunity for drug companies to shift greater
resources to finding cures to truly pathological conditions. Less money would be spent on the
next generation of Viagra and hopefully more would be spent trying to find vaccines for
AIDS.219

V. CONCLUSION

This article has demonstrated the real potential for expressive harms to marginalized
biologically-defined groups, where the patent communicates that these biological conditions are
in fact pathological instead merely a form of diversity within the human race. There are a variety
of options presented to deal with this concern, but all of them have there advantages and
difficulties. None perfectly solves the problem. At a minimum, this article calls for a
reconsideration of what we mean by “useful” in patent law.
In fact, the ultimate utility that we may be protecting is that of choice – allowing persons
to determine how best to use these technologies. But falling back on choice does not answer the
question of why the government should be involved in granting patent rights for these
discoveries. Choice alone as purely a “good” is quite debatable in the context of privatized

219

Given the markets for such “lifestyle drugs,” however, it seems unlikely that all research
into these areas would completely dry up without patent protection.
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eugenics, which the patent system is poised to incentivize.220 The right to choose may
accompany a considerable cost – elimination of groups considered outside the norm.221 While
the regulation of this choice undeniably lies outside of the patent system,222 that system need not
embrace destructive choices by allocating a given technology as “useful” regardless of the harm
that invention might inflict. The government should not be facilitating such activities with the
patent system.
The patent system is one of incentives – if an inventor will engage in research resulting in
a patentable invention, she is rewarded with the patent’s period of exclusivity, which allows the
inventor to recoup her sunk costs and preventing free-riding by competitors. There is no doubt
that denying patents in this area will not stop research into such technologies – other public
measures would be required.223 Eliminating, or modifying the availability of, patent rights in
these areas would at least help to mitigate these commercial interests and make such innovations
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FUKUYAMA, supra note 15, at 100 (“[W]e should be skeptical of libertarian arguments
that say that as long as eugenic choices are being bade my individuals rather than by states, we
needn’t worry about possible bad consequences. Free markets work well much of the time, but
there are also market failures that require government intervention to correct. Negative
externalities do not simply take care of themselves.”); HAMER & COPELAND, LIVING, supra note
14, at 302 (“How will we distinguish ‘good’ genes from ‘bad’? What traits will be valued and
what will be discarded? Who gets to choose?”).
221
Of course, the ultimate result of genetic research could be that everyone has some sort of
genetic predisposition, so that “the ‘normal’ population may be reduced to the point at which
genetic discrimination becomes unfeasible.” Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 14, at 337. There
may remain certain traits, particularly those close to identity, that may be given greater weight
over others that do not implicate personhood concerns.
222
See Dresser, supra note 164, at 424-31 (recognizing that “fears expressed about animal
patenting fail to apply to patenting alone; instead, they bear on the broader issue of whether
scientists should be permitted to manipulate higher animal life at all” and addressing possible
regulations without the patent system).
223
Others have already called for public regulation on biotechnology. See FUKUYAMA,
supra note 15, at 10 & 182 (2002). There may be reason to doubt, of course, whether such
regulation would limit the use of tests to assess homosexuality. See Schüklenk, supra note 197
(“Indeed, why should we assume that legislators in homophobic societies would regulate the use
of such devices in the first place?”).
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less desirable. Regardless, though, do we really want the patent system – with the approbation of
a government-granted right – to incentivize the creation of inventions with such powerful
expressive harms and enormous eugenic potential? Simply because denying patent protection
will not stop these technologies does not mean that we should, therefore, continue to grant these
patents and create incentives for harmful and potentially destructive discoveries.224
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Cf. FUKUYAMA, supra note 15, at 10(“The fact that there are some individuals or
organizations that violate these rules, or that there are countries, where the rules are either
nonexistent or poorly enforced, is no excuse for not making the rules in the first place. People
get away with robbery and murder, after all, which is not a reason to legalize theft and
homicide.”).
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